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Abstract—In this paper, we present dynamic systems over
encrypted data that compute the next state and the output
using homomorphic properties of the cryptosystem, which has
equivalent performance to the linear dynamic controllers over
real-valued signals. Assuming that the input as well as the output
of the plant is encrypted and transmitted to the system, the state
matrix of the system is designed to consist of integers. This allows
the proposed dynamic system to operate for infinite time horizon,
without decryption or reset of the state. For implementation
in practice, the use of cryptosystems based on Learning With
Errors problem is considered, which allows both multiplication
and addition over encrypted data. The effect of injecting errors
during encryption is in turn controlled under closed-loop stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen the development of networked
control systems, and the threat of cyber-attacks has been a
major problem. Against the intrusion of unauthorized access
to computing devices in the network, the use of homomorphic
encryption has been introduced [1]–[3], so as to protect all the
data in the network by encryption while the control operation
is directly performed on the encrypted data without decryption.
As the significance of encrypted control is elimination of
the decryption key from the network so that it decreases the
vulnerability, it has been applied to various targets such as
quadratic optimization [4], average consensus [5], cooperative
control [6], model predictive control [7], and reset control [8].
However, dynamic control operation over encrypted data
has been a challenge, in which the state of the controller
is recursively updated as an encrypted variable and managed
without the decryption. As it requires recursive multiplication
with fractional numbers in general, it is necessary for digital
controllers to truncate the significand of the state from time to
time, to avoid the overflow (see Section III-A). Such truncation
would be performed by right shift or division of numbers, but
it is impossible for general homomorphic cryptosystems to
perform the division of messages an infinite number of times.
As a consequence, it has been a common concern in litera-
ture, and several attempts have been made to deal with linear
dynamic controllers, but they have been necessarily based on
periodic “reset” of the controller state. For example, the use of
bootstrapping technique [9] of fully homomorphic encryption
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is considered in [2], for the refreshment of the state and
unlimited operation. However, its computational complexity
hinders it from being used in practice. In [8], the reset of the
state to the initial value is considered, but as it may lose its
value, it may result in the degradation of the performance.
In this paper, we propose a method to perform the operation
of linear dynamic controllers over encrypted data, for infinite
time horizon without the reset or decryption of the state. Fol-
lowing the observation made in [10] that linear systems having
integer state matrix avoids the overflow problem without the
truncation of the significand of the state (see Section III-B),
the proposed scheme is based on the conversion of controllers
to have integer state matrix. Treating both the input and the
output of the plant as external input of the controller, it will be
seen that any linear controller can be converted to have integer
state matrix but have the same input-output relation, so that
it can operate for infinite time horizon over encrypted data
without the reset. The parameters of the proposed controller
is suggested, to prevent the performance degradation.
The proposed method is applicable with any cryptosystems
that allow additions over encrypted data, such as the Paillier
encryption [11], but the use of recent cryptosystems based
on Learning With Errors (LWE) problem [12], [13] is also
suggested. Compared with the Paillier cryptosystem that has
been commonly used for control operations, as in [3]–[8],
advantages of using LWE-based schemes are listed as follows:
• LWE-based schemes have both abilities of addition and
multiplication over encrypted data, so that it can protect
both control parameters and signals, by encryption.
• Based on the worst-case lattice problem instead of the
factoring problem, they are known as post-quantum cryp-
tosystems, i.e., secure against quantum computers [14].
• With the Paillier encryption, the operation units over
encrypted data consist of exponentiations and divisions,
so that it may require computation methods such as Mont-
gomery algorithms in practice, as in [15]. In contrast, with
the scheme in [13] which utilizes a distinct encryption
method for the control parameters, the units consist of
matrix multiplications and bit operations so that it has
benefits of simple implementation (see Appendix A).
In terms of the use of LWE-based schemes, a key to the
security is the injection of random errors to the encrypted mes-
sages, which in fact may grow under the recursive operation
and hinder the unlimited operation. Thus, in cryptography, it
has been handled with the bootstrapping techniques [9] costing
a substantial amount of computational resources, so as to reset
the grown errors. In contrast, as applied to control systems, we
suggest that the effect of the errors can be regarded as external
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2disturbances so that it can be controlled under the closed-loop
stability. As a result, it will be seen that the proposed method
based on LWE-based encryptions can perform the recursive
operation for infinite time horizon and have the same level of
performance, without bootstrapping.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows.
Section II begins with preliminaries and the problem formu-
lation of unlimited dynamic operation over encrypted data.
Section III reviews the overflow problem under recursive mul-
tiplication by fractional numbers, and suggests the benefit of
integer state matrix. Section IV proposes the novel conversion
scheme for linear controllers to have integer state matrix,
and presents the main result. Finally, Section V illustrates
simulation results, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Homomorphic Encryption
Let the set of plaintexts (unencrypted data) be given as
ZN :=
{
i ∈ Z : −N
2
≤ i < N
2
}
,
which is a set of integers, of cardinality N ∈ N. As all integers
divided by N can have the remainder in ZN , we define the
modulo operation of a ∈ Z by N , as
a mod N := a−
⌊
a+ N2
N
⌋
N,
in which b·c is the floor function, so that a mod N ∈ ZN for
all a ∈ Z. Then, the set ZN is closed under modular addition
and multiplication1.
For the cryptosystem to be used throughout the paper, we
consider the set C as the space of ciphertexts (encrypted data),
and Enc : ZN → C and Dec : C → ZN as the encryption
and decryption algorithms2, respectively. As homomorphic
encryption schemes allow operations over encrypted data in
which the decryption of the operation result matches the result
of modular arithmetic over plaintexts in ZN , we suppose that
the cryptosystem under consideration is at least additively
homomorphic; with operations defined in C, it satisfies the
following properties3.
H1: There exists ∆Enc ≥ 0 such that for every m ∈ ZN , it
satisfies Dec(Enc(m)) = m + ∆ mod N , with some
∆ ∈ Z such that |∆| ≤ ∆Enc.
H2: There exists Add : C×C → C such that for every c1 ∈ C
and c2 ∈ C, it satisfies Dec(Add(c1, c2)) = Dec(c1) +
Dec(c2) + ∆ mod N , with some ∆ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
H3: There exists IntMult : Z × C → C such that for every
k ∈ Z and c ∈ C, it satisfies Dec(IntMult(k, c)) =
k · Dec(c) + ∆ mod N , with some ∆ ∈ Z such that
|∆| ≤ |k|.
A remark is made about the presence of the error term ∆;
it is to include recent homomorphic encryption schemes based
1 For integers a and b, we consider a + b mod N for modular addition
and a · b mod N for modular multiplication with respect to the set ZN .
2A secret key (or a public key) should be an argument of the algorithms
Enc and Dec, but it is omitted for simplicity.
3 In practice, the property H3 can be obtained from H2 of addition.
on Learning With Errors (LWE) problem [12], such as [13]
or [16], which necessarily inject “errors” to every message
being encrypted, for the sake of security. Otherwise, the use
of Paillier encryption [11], a typical example of additively
homomorphic cryptosystems, still can be considered, which
satisfies H1–H3 with ∆ = 0 for all cases.
Remark 1: In H1, the “injected error” ∆ can be eliminated
in practice. Indeed, if we use EncL : m 7→ Enc(m/L) and
DecL : c 7→ dL · Dec(c)c instead of Enc and Dec, where
d·c is the rounding operation, and 1/L ∈ N is such that
1/L > 2∆Enc, we obtain DecL(EncL(m)) = dm+ L∆c = m.
However, when it comes to H2 and H3, the error effect cannot
be eliminated in general, especially when encrypted data are
updated by the operations for unlimited number of times. 
Additively homomorphic encryption schemes allow both
addition and multiplication over encrypted data, but in H3, one
may hope to conceal not only the information in c ∈ C but also
the multiplier k ∈ Z. To this end, we consider multiplicatively
homomorphic property as well, in which a separate algorithm
may be used for encrypting the multipliers, in general. For
example, the method presented in [13] can be employed, to
make the use of the following property (see Appendix A for
further details of the encryption method).
H4: There exist Enc′ : ZN → C′, Mult : C′ × C → C,
and ∆Mult ≥ 0 such that for every k ∈ ZN and c ∈
C, it satisfies Dec(Mult(Enc′(k), c)) = k · Dec(c) + ∆
mod N , with some ∆ ∈ Z such that |∆| ≤ ∆Mult + |k|.
Exploiting the properties H2 and H4, it is easily seen that
matrix multiplication over encrypted messages can be done.
Let us abuse notation and write c1 + c2 := Add(c1, c2) and
c′ · c1 := Mult(c′, c1) for ciphertexts c1 ∈ C, c2 ∈ C, and
c′ ∈ C′, as usual, and use Enc : ZnN → Cn, Enc′ : Zm×nN →
C′m×n, Dec : Cm → ZmN , and + : Cm×Cm → Cm to apply the
algorithms to each component of a matrix (or a vector). Then,
multiplication of a vector [cj ] ∈ Cn by a matrix [c′ij ] ∈ C′m×n
is defined as c
′
11 · · · c′1n
...
. . .
...
c′m1 · · · c′mn
 ·
c1...
cn
 :=
 c
′
11 · c1
...
c′m1 · c1
+ · · ·+
 c
′
1n · cn
...
c′mn · cn

so that for every K ∈ Zm×nN and c ∈ Cn, it satisfies
Dec(Enc′(K) · c) = K · Dec(c) + ∆ mod N (1)
with some ∆ ∈ Zn such that ‖∆‖ ≤ ‖K‖+ n∆Mult + n− 1,
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the infinity norm of matrices or vectors.
Utilizing the additively homomorphic properties H2 and H3
only, a property of matrix multiplication analogous to (1) is
obtained, having either the multiplier or the multiplicand of
the matrix multiplication as plaintext. For example, we define
multiplication of a vector [cj ] ∈ Cn by a (plaintext) matrix
[kij ] ∈ Zm×n ask11 · · · k1n... . . . ...
km1 · · · kmn
 ·
c1...
cn
 :=
k11 · c1...
km1 · c1
+ · · ·+
k1n · cn...
kmn · cn

where kij · cj := IntMult(kij , cj). Then, for every K ∈ Zm×n
3and c ∈ Cn, it satisfies
Dec(K · c) = K · Dec(c) + ∆ mod N (2)
with some ∆ ∈ Zn such that ‖∆‖ ≤ ‖K‖+ n− 1.
B. Problem Formulation
Consider a continuous-time plant written by
x˙p(t) = f(xp(t), up(t)),
yp(t) = h(xp(t)),
t ≥ 0, (3)
where xp ∈ Rnp is the state, up ∈ Rm is the input, and yp ∈ Rp
is the output of the plant, respectively. To control the plant (3),
we suppose that a discrete-time linear time-invariant feedback
controller has been designed as
x(t+ 1) = Fx(t) +Gy(t) + Pr(t) + ex(t), (4a)
u(t) = Hx(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t) + eu(t), (4b)
x(0) = x0 + e0, t = 0, 1, 2, ...,
where y(t) := yp(t · Ts) ∈ Rp, t = 0, 1, ..., is the plant output
discretized with the sampling time Ts > 0, x(t) ∈ Rn is
the state of the controller with the initial condition x0 ∈ Rn,
r(t) ∈ Rq is the reference input, u(t) ∈ Rm is the output of the
controller, and {ex(t), eu(t), e0} are perturbations caused by,
for example, quantization of signals. The discrete signal u(t)
is fed back to the continuous-time plant (3) as up(t) = u(t),
for t · Ts ≤ t < (t+ 1) · Ts.
For the case when there is no perturbation, i.e., ex(t) ≡ 0,
eu(t) ≡ 0, and e0 = 0, the states and outputs of (3) and (4)
are written as x′p(t), y
′
p(t), x
′(t), and u′(t), respectively.
The design of the controller (4) is supposed to (locally)
stabilize the closed-loop system. From this rationale, we make
two assumptions as follows, the first of which is for the
stability of closed-loop system with respect to perturbations.
Assumption 1: Given  > 0, there exists η() > 0 such
that supt(‖ex(t)‖) ≤ η(), supt(‖eu(t)‖) ≤ η(), and ‖e0‖ ≤
η() implies
‖xp(t)− x′p(t)‖ ≤ , ‖yp(t)− y′p(t)‖ ≤ , (5a)
‖x(t)− x′(t)‖ ≤ , ‖u(t)− u′(t)‖ ≤ , (5b)
for all t ≥ 0 and t ∈ N ∪ {0}, respectively. 
In addition, the input, the state, and the output of the
controller are assumed to be bounded, as follows, which is
necessary because of the finiteness of the plaintext space ZN .
Assumption 2: There exist compact sets Y ⊂ Rp, R ⊂ Rq,
X ⊂ Rn, and U ⊂ Rm, which are known, such that y′(t) ∈ Y ,
r(t) ∈ R, x′(t) ∈ X , and u′(t) ∈ U , for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. 
Finally, the problem of encrypting controller is posed. The
objective is to construct a dynamic system defined on the
ciphertext space that satisfies the followings:
• It performs the operation of (4) over encrypted data;
the encrypted controller receives encryptions of the plant
output y(t), and computes both the next state and the
output of the controller, with the use of homomorphic
properties of the cryptosystem. The output of the en-
crypted controller is decrypted, and fed back to the plant.
• The performance of the encrypted controller in the
closed-loop is equivalent to that of (4); given  > 0,
the parameters for the encryption are chosen so that the
performance error of the decrypted output u(t) of the
controller satisfies ‖u(t)−u′(t)‖ ≤  for all t ∈ N∪{0}.
• It can operate for infinite time horizon, without decryp-
tion or reset for the state of the encrypted controller.
III. ENCRYPTION OF DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
In this section, we show how to utilize the properties H1–
H4 of the cryptosystem to perform the operation of the given
controller (4) over encrypted data. In terms of the dynamic
operation for infinite time horizon, the benefit of systems
having integer state matrix is addressed.
First, we deal with encryption and operation methods for
real-valued signals and parameters, where the limitation on
recursive multiplication by fractional numbers is to be seen.
A. Operation over Encrypted Non-integer Real Numbers
Let us begin with encryption of the input of the controller
(4). Since the components of signals y(t) and r(t) are not
integers in general, they are converted to elements of the plain-
text space ZN , with quantization; let {ry,i}pi=1 and {rr,i}qi=1
of positive real numbers be step sizes for each component of
y(t) = {yi(t)}pi=1 and r(t) = {ri(t)}qi=1, respectively, so that
the i-th components yi(t) and ri(t) are quantized as4
yi(t) 7→
⌈
yi(t)
ry,i
⌋
, ri(t) 7→
⌈
ri(t)
rr,i
⌋
,
respectively. Then, a parameter 1/L ≥ max({1/ry,i}pi=1 ∪
{1/rr,i}qi=1) is chosen so that they are scaled as
y(t) := col
{⌈
ry,i
L
⌈
yi(t)
ry,i
⌋⌋}p
i=1
∈ Zp,
r(t) := col
{⌈
rr,i
L
⌈
ri(t)
rr,i
⌋⌋}q
i=1
∈ Zq,
(6)
where col{·} is the stacking operation for column vectors. The
encrypted signals y(t) ∈ Cp and r(t) ∈ Cq are defined as5
y(t) := Enc(y(t) mod N),
r(t) := Enc(r(t) mod N).
(7)
The precision of the messages in y(t) and r(t) depends on
the parameter 1/L as well as the quantizers. For example, the
4 Throughout the paper, we consider a basic type of uniform quantizers,
for simplicity. Since Assumption 2 guarantees the boundedness of the signals,
the use of saturation functions which determine the range of quantized signals
is omitted as well. In practice, for example, the signal yi(t) can be quantized
as
yi(t) 7→ min
{⌈
ymaxi
ry,i
⌋
, max
{⌈
ymini
ry,i
⌋
,
⌈
yi(t)− yoffseti
ry,i
⌋}}
,
where yoffseti ∈ R is the parameter for the offset, and ymini ∈ R and
ymaxi ∈ R determines the range for the quantizer, which can be determined
with information of the set Y in Assumption 2.
5In this subsection, it is understood that the size N of the plaintext space
is given sufficiently large, so that the modulo operation by N does nothing
about the values of y and r. For the general setting of N , see Section III-B.
4message in the i-th component yi(t) ∈ C of y(t) recovered
by decryption will be obtained as
Dec(yi(t)) =
⌈
ry,i
L
⌈
yi(t)
ry,i
⌋⌋
+ ∆ mod N
with some integer |∆| ≤ ∆Enc as in H1. As long as |yi(t)/L|+
∆Enc < N/2, the value of yi(t) can be recovered as
L · Dec(yi(t)) = L
⌈
ry,i
L
⌈
yi(t)
ry,i
⌋⌋
+ L∆
=: ry,i
⌈
yi(t)
ry,i
⌋
+ δL + L∆
=: yi(t) + δr,i + δL + L∆,
(8)
where |δL| ≤ L/2 and |δr,i| ≤ ry,i/2 so that the recovered
result can be made arbitrarily close6 to yi(t), by increasing
the parameters 1/ry,i and 1/L. Thus, encrypted signals y(t)
and r(t) can be understood to have the “scaled” values of
y(t)/L and r(t)/L, respectively.
The computation algorithms over encrypted messages are
basically performed with integers, as well, but homomorphic
operations such as multiplication by real matrices are also
rendered possible using additional “scaling factors”. For ex-
ample, with the help of homomorphic operations defined in
Section II-A, the first output u(0) of (4) can be computed
over encrypted data as7
u(0) =
⌈
H
s
⌋
x(0) +
⌈
J
s
⌋
y(0) +
⌈
Q
s
⌋
r(0), (9)
where 1/s ≥ 1 is the scaling factor to convert the matrices
to integers, and we suppose x(0) = [0, · · · , 0]> ∈ Zn so
that x(0) = Enc(x(0)), for simplicity. Then, according to the
homomorphic properties, it satisfies
Dec(u(0)) =
⌈
H
s
⌋
Dec(x(0)) +
⌈
J
s
⌋
Dec(y(0))
+
⌈
Q
s
⌋
Dec(r(0)) + ∆ mod N
with some ∆ ∈ Z, and as in (8), the message u(0) can be
recovered with sufficiently large 1/L and 1/s, as
Ls · Dec(u(0)) ≈ s
⌈
J
s
⌋
y(0) + s
⌈
Q
s
⌋
r(0) + Ls∆
≈ u(0), (10)
as long as the norm of the term Ls∆ can be made sufficiently
small8, and the size N of plaintext space is given sufficiently
large. Here, the outcome u(0) can be understood to have the
message of u(0)/(Ls).
Now, for the dynamic operation of (4) over encrypted data,
let us try to compute x(t) ∈ Cn and u(t) ∈ Cm, t = 1, 2, ...,
recursively, which are supposed to have messages of x(t) and
6In (8), it is worthy of note that the size of the perturbation L∆, which
is due to the injected errors of cryptosystems, can be made arbitrarily small
with the choice of 1/L.
7For vectors and matrices, let d·c and b·c be component-wise rounding
operation and floor operation, respectively.
8We defer the discussion about the effect of injected errors until the next
subsection.
u(t) at each time t, respectively. As a first attempt, we make
the use of matrices in (4) converted to integers simply by
scaling and rounding, just as in (9). For the first iteration of
(4), the state x(1) can be updated as
x(1) =
⌈
F
s
⌋
x(0) +
⌈
G
s
⌋
y(0) +
⌈
P
s
⌋
r(0),
with the factor 1/s, so that x(1) has the message of x(1)/(Ls).
But from the second iteration, the state x(t), which already
have been multiplied with the scaling factor 1/s, is again
multiplied by the scaled matrix dF/sc for the next update.
As a result, it can be checked, by induction, that the state
x(t) at time t should be of the scale 1/(Lst), i.e., x(t) should
have the message of x(t)/(Lst); if it is true at time t, and if
x(t) is to be multiplied by the scaled matrix dF/sc again, the
term dF/scx(t) will have the message of the scale 1/(Lst+1).
Then, the next state x(t+ 1) should be computed as
x(t+ 1) =
⌈
F
s
⌋
x(t) +
⌈
G
st+1
⌋
y(t) +
⌈
P
st+1
⌋
r(t), (11a)
and the message of x(t+ 1) becomes of the scale 1/(Lst+1).
Similarly, the output u(t) of the system, which is to be
decrypted, is computed as
u(t) =
⌈
H
s
⌋
x(t) +
⌈
J
st+1
⌋
y(t) +
⌈
Q
st+1
⌋
r(t), (11b)
which it is supposed to have the message of u(t)/(Lst+1).
Finally, let us consider the correctness of (11). One may
expect that decryption of u(t) yields the correct result as
Lst+1 · Dec(u(t)) ≈ u(t) (12)
at each time t, and it might be correct for the first several time
steps, just as in (10). However, it is hopeless as the time goes
by, when the matrices in (4) are not integers so that 1/s > 1.
To see why, let us look at the left-hand-side of (12). Since the
length of the range of Dec(·) is N , the length of the range that
each component of the left-hand-side can cover is not more
than NLst+1 at each time t, which tends to zero as t tends to
infinity. Hence, no matter how large the parameter N may be
chosen, it is impossible to cover the range set of u(t) for the
whole time.
An attempt might be made to divide the state x(t) by the
accumulated factor 1/st, from time to time, in order to reset
the scale of x(t) and u(t). However, for general crytosystems
having no more than the properties H1–H4, it is impossible to
perform the division over encrypted data unlimited number of
times9. Therefore, we conclude that a linear dynamic system
over encrypted data, implemented in the usual way, fails to
operate for infinite time horizon in general.
Getting back to the operation of (11), let us observe that the
cause of the failure is the accumulative scaling factor of the
state x(t). Furthermore, taking a closer look at the reasoning,
9 In fact, it is known that such divisions by scaling factors can be possible
an unlimited number of times, when the “bootstrapping” techniques of fully
homomorphic encryptions [9] are employed. However, as the complexity of
the bootstrapping process hinders it from being used for dynamic feedback
controls, one of the objectives of this paper is not to make the use of
bootstrapping algorithms.
5let us check that the accumulation is totally attributable to
the scaling of the state matrix F to dF/sc, which would be
dispensable if all the entries of F were integers. Following
this rationale, toward the dynamic operation over encrypted
data for infinite time horizon, the approach of this paper is to
convert the given controller (4) to have integer state matrix. To
support the validity of this approach, in the next subsection, we
show that the encryption of dynamic systems having integer
state matrix can be implemented to operate for infinite time
horizon, in which the performance as well as the effect of
injected errors during the encryption is analyzed.
B. Systems having Integer State Matrix
To describe the encryption method for controllers having
integer state matrix, in this subsection, we temporarily assume
that the state matrix of (4) consists of integers, i.e., F ∈ Zn×n.
In terms of encryption, the benefit of systems having integer
state matrix is that they can be converted to systems over
integers by scaling, in which the scale of the state is fixed.
To see the detail, let us convert the controller (4) to a system
over integers, before the encryption. As the plant output y(t)
and the reference output r(t) have already been converted to
integers as (6), we choose a scaling factor 1/s1 ≥ 1 for the
matrices G and P in (4) so that the part (4a) of the controller
is converted to operate over integers as
x(t+ 1) = Fx(t) +
⌈
G
s1
⌋
y(t) +
⌈
P
s1
⌋
r(t)
=: Fx(t) +Gy(t) + Pr(t) (13a)
x(0) =
⌈
x0
Ls1
⌋
.
Thanks to the state matrix F consisting of integers, it is seen
that the construction is noticeably better than (11a); as there
is no recursive multiplication by a scaling factor as in (11a),
the state x(t) has the value of x(t)/(Ls1) for all t. Indeed, let
the errors due to the truncation in (13a) be denoted as
δx(t) :=
⌈
G
s1
⌋
· y(t)− Gy(t)
Ls1
+
⌈
P
s1
⌋
· r(t)− Pr(t)
Ls1
δ0 :=
⌈
x0
Ls1
⌋
− x0
Ls1
,
and suppose ex(t) and e0 in (4) be given by ex(t) = Ls1δx(t)
and e0 = Ls1δ0. Then, it satisfies x(t) = x(t)/(Ls1) for all t.
The conversion for the output (4b) is also straightforward;
with an additional factor 1/s2 ≥ 1, it is converted as
u(t) =
⌈
H
s2
⌋
x(t) +
⌈
J
s1s2
⌋
y(t) +
⌈
Q
s1s2
⌋
r(t)
=: Hx(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t),
(13b)
so that the output u(t) is of the (fixed) scale 1/(Ls1s2). Thus,
the plant input u(t) can be obtained as u(t) = Ls1s2u(t), but
more specifically, it is obtained as
u(t) = Su(u(t)) := col
{
ru,i
⌈
Ls1s2 · ui(t)
ru,i
⌋}m
i=1
, (14)
where ui(t) is the i-th component of u(t) ∈ Zm, and {ru,i}mi=1
of positive numbers are the step sizes of the quantizers for the
plant inputs. As a result, we can regard the result (14) as the
same as the output u(t) of (4b), with the term eu(t) in (4b)
given as eu(t) = Ls1s2δu(t) + (Su(u(t))− Ls1s2u(t)), where
δu(t) :=
(⌈
H
s2
⌋
− H
s2
)
x(t) +
⌈
J
s1s2
⌋
y(t)− Jy(t)
Ls1s2
+
⌈
Q
s1s2
⌋
r(t)− Qr(t)
Ls1s2
is the error caused by truncation in (13b).
According to the following proposition, the effect of trun-
cation errors in the closed-loop system is sufficiently small,
when the parameters 1/L, 1/s1, 1/s2, and 1/r are sufficiently
large, where r := max({ry,i}pi=1 ∪ {rr,i}qi=1 ∪ {ru,i}mi=1).
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a
function α : R4 → R3 of polynomials vanishing at the origin
such that for every L, s1, s2, and r satisfying ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤
η(), the controller (13) guarantees that (5) holds, for all t ≥ 0
and t ∈ N ∪ {0}. 
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. 
So far, it has been seen that the controller (4) can be
converted to operate over integers when F ∈ Zn×n, and thus,
the encryption of (4) can be implemented by operation of (13)
over encrypted messages of integers.
First of all, let us determine the size N of the plaintext space
ZN . Just to be on the safe side, one may choose N sufficiently
large so that all the messages x(t), y(t), r(t), and u(t) are
bounded by ±N/2. Then, the system (13) will be regarded
as a dynamics over ZN with modular arithmetic, in which, in
fact, the modulo operation by N does nothing about the values
of messages. Instead, we suggest that it is enough to have the
parameter N to cover the range set of the outcome u(t) of the
controller only, because it is the only message to be recovered
by the decryption. To this end, with the knowledge of the set
U from Assumption 2 which is compact, let us choose integers
{umin,i }mi=1 and {umax,i }mi=1 such that the following condition
holds; for every v = col{vi}mi=1 ∈ U , it satisfies
umin,i ≤
vi − − ru,i2
Ls1s2
and
vi + +
ru,i
2
Ls1s2
≤ umax,i , (15)
for all i = 1, ...,m, in which the terms  and {ru,i}mi=1, given
from Assumption 1 and (14), respectively, consider the margin
of error. Then, the size N of the plaintext space is determined
such that
N ≥ max
i=1,...,m
{umax,i − umin,i + 1}. (16)
Now, the encryption for systems having integer state matrix
is presented. To conceal the control parameters as well as
control signals, they are encrypted as “multipliers” with the
algorithm Enc′ introduced in Section II-A, a priori, as
F := Enc′(F mod N),
H := Enc′(H mod N),
P := Enc′(P mod N),
G := Enc′(G mod N),
J := Enc′(J mod N),
Q := Enc′(Q mod N).
With these encrypted matrices and encrypted signals (7), the
6dynamic controller over encrypted data is constructed as
x(t+ 1) = F · x(t) +G · y(t) +P · r(t)
u(t) = H · x(t) + J · y(t) +Q · r(t)
x(0) = Enc(x(0) mod N),
(17a)
in which x(t) ∈ Cn and u(t) ∈ Cm are the encrypted state and
output of the system, respectively, and all the operations of
additions and multiplications are based on the homomorphic
operations of the cryptosystem. The decryption rule for the
recovery of the plant input u(t) is defined as follows; the
outcome u(t) is first decrypted as
u(t) 7→ Dec(u(t))−
⌊
Dec(u(t))− col{umin,i }mi=1
N
⌋
N
=: mod(Dec(u(t)), N, {umin,i }mi=1)
so that each i-th component of the result is between umin,i and
umin,i +N − 1. Then, the plant input u(t) is obtained as
u(t) = Su
(
Dec(u(t))−
⌊
Dec(u(t))− col{umin,i }mi=1
N
⌋
N
)
= Su(mod(Dec(u(t)), N, {umin,i }mi=1)) (17b)
where Su : Zm → Rm is the function defined in (14).
Finally, the following theorem states that the dynamic
operation of (17) over encrypted data can be performed for
infinite time horizon when the given controller (4) has integer
state matrix. Compared with the ideal case, i.e., ex(t) ≡ 0,
eu(t) ≡ 0, and e0 = 0, it suggests that the performance error
can be made sufficiently small under the stability of closed-
loop system, by the choice of parameters.
Theorem 1: Suppose F ∈ Zn×n. Under Assumptions 1
and 2, there exists a function β : R4 → R3 of polynomials
vanishing at the origin such that for every L, s1, s2, and r
satisfying ‖β(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η(), the encrypted controller
(17) guarantees ‖u(t)− u′(t)‖ ≤ , for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. 
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. 
A remark is made about the comparison between the
controller (13) with quantized signals and the controller (17)
with encrypted signals, in terms of performance. In addition to
the effect of truncation of control signals and parameters, the
performance error of the encrypted controller is also due to the
effect of injected errors, which may affect the messages during
the homomorphic operation using the properties H1–H4. From
this observation, it can be deduced that either larger parameters
of 1/L, 1/s1, and 1/s2 for the scaling, or finer quantization
at the actuators and the sensors is required, so as to keep the
encrypted controller from the performance degradation.
Fortunately, the following corollary suggest that increasing
the parameter 1/L is enough to keep the same level of
performance10. Even if it requires more capacity for the digital
devices in the control loop, it will not require anything about
the quantization at sensors and actuators, in the physical layer.
10In fact, the increase of the factor 1/L as well as the modulus N may
change the value of ∆Mult in H4. But, it can be compensated by the choice
of the parameters of encryption scheme so that the value ∆Mult does not
increase. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1: Given  > 0, and L, s1, s2, and r such
that ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η(), there exists L′ > 0 such that
‖β(L′, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η(). 
Proof: We rewrite (37) as β(L, s1, s2, r) =: α(L, s1, s2, r) +
L · β′(s1, s2), where β′(0, 0) = [0, 0, 0]>. As it is clear that
‖β(0, s1, s2, r)‖ < ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ and ‖β(L, s1, s2, r)‖ >
‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖, there exists 0 < L′ < L such that
‖β(L′, s1, s2, r)‖ = ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖, by continuity. 
The operation of (17) is based on both multiplication and ad-
dition over encrypted data. But, provided that the information
of the matrices in (4) is disclosed, additively homomorphic
cryptosystems, which has the property H1–H3 only, can also
be used. Indeed, the controller can be encrypted as
x(t+ 1) = F · x(t) +G · y(t) + P · r(t)
u(t) = H · x(t) + J · y(t) +Q · r(t)
x(0) = Enc(x(0) mod N),
(18)
where the operation is based on the properties H3 and (2).
Since (17) and (18) share the same form of the dynamics for
the messages, it is obvious that the statement of Theorem 1 is
also true for the controller (18) with (17b).
Especially, for the case of using cryptosystems that does not
inject the errors during the encryption, as the example of the
Paillier cryptosystem [11], the following corollary states that
the performance of the encrypted controller (18) and that of
(13) are identical.
Corollary 2: If H1–H3 hold with ∆ = 0, the controller
(18) guarantees u(t) = mod(Dec(u(t)), N, {umin,i }mi=1) and
Dec(x(t)) = x(t) mod N , for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. 
Proof: According to (2), the messages x(t) = Dec(x(t)) and
u(t) = Dec(u(t)) obey (34), with ∆x(t) = 0 and ∆u(t) = 0
for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}, and ∆0 = 0, Then, Lemma 2 in
Appendix B and Proposition 1 complete the proof. 
So far, it has been seen that dynamic systems having integer
state matrix can be encrypted to operate for infinite time
horizon. As the requirement of integer state matrix may be
restrictive in practice, in the next section, we present a method
for converting the state matrix (consisting of non-integer real
numbers in general) to be integers, so that any linear controller
can be encrypted to operate for infinite time horizon, with the
equivalent performance.
Meanwhile, for the last part of this section, several examples
of controllers having integer state matrix are found as follows.
As scaling and truncation is enough for the conversion of
signals and parameters to integers, as (13), they have benefits
of simple implementation for the encryption.
Remark 2: Examples of systems having integer state matrix
are found as follows.
• Given a controller of finite impulse response, with the
transfer function of the form C(z) =
∑n
i=0 bn−iz
−i, it
can be realized as
x(t+ 1) =

0 · · · 0 0
1 · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · 1 0
x(t) +

1
0
...
0
 y(t)
u(t) =
[
bn−1 · · · b1 b0
]
x(t) + bny(t).
7• Let a discrete Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) con-
troller in the parallel form be given as
C(z) = kp +
kiTs
z − 1 +
kd
Ts
Nd
+ Tsz−1
where kp, ki, and kd are the proportional, integral, and
derivative gains, respectively, Ts is the sampling time,
and Nd ∈ N is the parameter for the derivative filter. It
can be realized as
x(t+ 1) =
[
2−Nd Nd − 1
1 0
]
x(t) +
[
1
0
]
y(t)
u(t) =
[
b1 b0
]
x(t) + b2y(t),
where b1 = kiTs − kdN2d/Ts, b0 = kiTsNd − kiTs +
kdN
2
d/Ts, and b2 = kp + kdNd/Ts. 
Even if the given state matrix F of (4) does not consist of
integers, there may exist an invertible matrix T ∈ Rn×n such
that it can be transformed to have the state matrix as integers,
as TFT−1 ∈ Zn×n. Considering that the entries of the
state matrix determine the poles as well as the characteristic
polynomial of the system, a couple of sufficient conditions for
the transformation of controllers to have integer state matrix
can be found, as the following propositions.
Proposition 2: Given F ∈ Rn×n, there exists T ∈ Rn×n
such that TFT−1 ∈ Zn×n, if every eigenvalue of F is such
that both the real part and the imaginary part are integers. 
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. 
A sufficient condition for single-output controllers (single-
input plant) is found, under which both matrices F and H of
(4) can be transformed to integers so that the scaling of H by
1/s2 for the conversion is dispensable, i.e., 1/s2 = 1.
Proposition 3: If the coefficients of the characteristic poly-
nomial of F ∈ Rn×n are all integers, and the pair (F,H) is
observable where H ∈ R1×n, there exists T ∈ Rn×n such that
TFT−1 ∈ Zn×n and HT−1 ∈ Z1×n. 
Proof: It is obvious that the matrix T ∈ Rn×n that trans-
forms (4) into the observable canonical form yields
TFT−1 =

0 · · · 0 a0
1 · · · 0 a1
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · 1 an−1
 , HT−1 = [0 · · · 0 1] ,
where ai ∈ Z for every i = 1, · · · , n− 1. 
IV. CONVERSION TO INTEGER STATE MATRIX
In this section, we remove the temporary assumption F ∈
Zn×n, and propose a method for converting the controller (4) to
a system over integers, in which the conversion of state matrix
F ∈ Rn×n to integers is also considered. And, the main result
of the encryption of general linear controllers is presented.
In the previous section, Propositions 2 and 3 considered
coordinate transformation of the controller (4) so as to obtain
integer state matrix. However, in fact, transformation by itself
is not enough to obtain integer state matrix for all cases; the
condition TFT−1 ∈ Zn×n implies that the coefficients of
its characteristic polynomial det(sIn − TFT−1) are integers,
where In ∈ Rn×n is the identity matrix, but due to the
invariance det(sIn − F ) = det(sIn − TFT−1), such T does
not exist when the coefficients of det(sIn−F ) are not integers.
To cover the whole class of linear controllers for the en-
cryption as well as the operation for infinite time horizon, we
suggest that an auxiliary input for the controller is considered
so that it converts the “outward” state matrix to be integers,
which in fact does nothing about the performance of the
controller. More specifically, the characteristic polynomial of
the state matrix, which was invariant under the coordinate
transformation, is to be converted by considering both the
plant input u(t) the plant output y(t) as external input of
the controller; let us observe that, from the relation u(t) =
Hx(t) + Jy(t) + Qr(t), the right-hand-side of the part (4a)
can be re-written as
Fx(t) +Gy(t) + Pr(t)
= (F−RH)x(t) + (G−RJ)y(t) + (P−RQ)r(t) +Ru(t),
with a matrix R ∈ Rn×m, where we suppose ex(t) = 0 and
eu(t) = 0 for simplicity. Then, regarding the signal u(t) as an
external input for the controller, the conversion of state matrix
by coordinate transformation can be considered with respect
to the new state matrix F −RH .
Then, as the value of the matrix R does not affect the perfor-
mance of the controller so that it can be freely chosen for the
conversion, we consider pole-placement design for R so that
the matrix F −RH can be transformed to integers, by change
of coordinate. For example, if all the eigenvalues of F −RH
can be chosen to be integers, then Proposition 2 will guarantee
that there exists T ∈ Rn×n such that T (F −RH)T−1 ∈ Zn×n,
i.e., the given controller (4) can be converted to have integer
state matrix.
As the pole-placement design for the matrix R requires
observability of the pair (F,H), which may not be observable
in general, we consider Kalman observable decomposition for
the controller; with an invertible matrix W = [W>1 ,W
>
2 ]
> ∈
Rn×n such that z1 = W1x ∈ Rn′ and z2 = W2x ∈ Rn−n′
where n′ ≤ n, the controller (4) is transformed into the form
z1(t+ 1) = F11z1(t) +W1(Gy(t) + Pr(t) + ex(t)) (19a)
z2(t+ 1) = F21z1(t) + F22z2(t)
+W2(Gy(t) + Pr(t) + ex(t))
(19b)
u(t) = H1z1(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t) + eu(t), (19c)
in which the pair (F11, H1) is observable. Then, as the sub-
state z2 is not reflected in the output u(t) of the controller,
we can remove out the part (19b) and obtain the “reduced”
controller (19a) with (19c).
Finally, the observability of (F11, H1) enables the design of
R1 ∈ Rn′×m such that all the eigenvalues of F11 −R1H1 are
integers, so that there exists T1 ∈ Rn′×n′ such that T1(F11 −
R1H1)T
−1
1 ∈ Zn
′×n′ , thanks to Proposition 2. As a result,
we have the following lemma, which suggests that the state
matrix F of the controller (4) can be converted to integers.
Lemma 1: Given (F,H), there exist F ′ ∈ Zn′×n′ , n′ ≤ n,
H ′ ∈ Rm×n′ , T ∈ Rn′×n, and R ∈ Rn′×m where rank(T) =
n′, such that (F ′ + RH ′)T = TF and H ′T = H . 
Proof: Note that, in (19), the projection z1 = W1x is defined
8such that F11W1 = W1F and H1W1 = H , as it guarantees
F11(W1x) = F11z1 = W1(Fx) and H1(W1x) = H1z1 =
Hx for every x ∈ Rn. Then, the existence is guaranteed with
H ′ = H1T−11 , T = T1W1, R = T1R1, and F
′ = T1(F11 −
R1H1)T
−1
1 . It completes the proof. 
Remark 3: Note that the eigenvalues of F ′ may not be of
integers in general, as the design of R and T is not unique. 
Now, with the matrices T and R obtained in Lemma 1, it
can be seen how the controller (4) is converted to have integer
state matrix, and how it is encrypted. First, by multiplying both
sides of (4a) by T from the left, it yields
Tx(t+ 1) = (F ′+RH ′)Tx(t) +TGy(t) +TPr(t) +Tex(t),
(20)
and thus, with respect to a new variable z := Tx ∈ Rn′ for
the state, the converted controller is obtained as the form
z(t+ 1) = F ′z(t) + (TG− RJ)y(t)
+ (TP − RQ)r(t) + Ru(t) + ez(t)
u(t) = H ′z(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t) + eu(t),
z(0) = Tx0 + e
′
0
(21)
where ez(t) = Tex(t) − Reu(t) and e′0 = Te0 denote the
perturbations with respect to the state z(t).
As the output u(t) of the controller is to be treated as an
external input of the controller as well, scaling of u(t) =
col{ui(t)}mi=1 using the parameter 1/L is considered as the
same in (6); we define
u′(t) := col
{⌈
ru,i
L
⌈
ui(t)
ru,i
⌋⌋}m
i=1
∈ Zm, (22)
where now the parameter 1/L should be chosen such that
1/L ≥ max({1/ry,i}pi=1 ∪ {1/rr,i}qi=1 ∪ {1/ru,i}mi=1).
Then, as the state matrix is converted to integers, i.e.,
F ′ ∈ Zn′×n′ , the encryption becomes straightforward, as
illustrated in the previous section. To convert (21) to a system
over integers, we define
G
′
:=
⌈
TG− RJ
s1
⌋
, P
′
:=
⌈
TP − RQ
s1
⌋
, R :=
⌈
R
s1
⌋
,
and H
′
:= dH ′/s2c. As the same as in (13), we can have the
controller operate over integers as
z(t+ 1) = F ′z(t) +G
′
y(t) + P
′
r(t) + Ru′(t)
u(t) = H
′
z(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t)
z(0) =
⌈
Tx0
Ls1
⌋ (23)
where the state z(t) has the value of z(t)/(Ls1) and the output
u(t) has the value of u(t)/(Ls1s2), so that the plant input u(t)
is recovered as u(t) = Su(u(t)), just as in (14).
Finally, the encryption of the controller (4) based on the
conversion of state matrix is proposed as
z(t+ 1) = F′ · z(t) +G′ · y(t) +P′ · r(t) +R · u′(t)
u(t) = H′ · z(t) + J · y(t) +Q · r(t) (24a)
z(0) = Enc(z(0) mod N),
where z(t) ∈ Cn′ is the state and u(t) ∈ Cm is the output,
and the encryptions for the converted matrices as well as the
encryption for the plant input are defined as
F′ := Enc′(F ′ mod N),
P′ := Enc′(P
′
mod N),
u′(t) := Enc(u′(t) mod N),
G′ := Enc′(G
′
mod N),
H′ := Enc′(H
′
mod N),
R := Enc′(R mod N).
As the same as in (17b), the plant input u(t) is obtained as
u(t) = Su(mod(Dec(u(t)), N, {umin,i }mi=1)). (24b)
And, as the end result, the following theorem states that
any linear controller can be encrypted to operate for infinite
time horizon, in which the performance error can be made
sufficiently small, with the choice of parameters.
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a
function γ : R4 → R3 of polynomials vanishing at the origin
such that for every L, s1, s2, and r satisfying ‖γ(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤
η(), the encrypted controller (24) guarantees ‖u(t)−u′(t)‖ ≤
, for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. 
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. 
Remark 4: As the plant input u(t) considered as the output
as well as input of the proposed controller, the order of
process of the controller at each time step, as well as its well-
definedness, is understood as follows:
1) By induction, at time t, the state z(t) of (24) is stored in
the controller. The inputs y(t) and r(t) of the controller,
encrypted as (6) and (7), are received.
2) With z(t), y(t), and r(t), the controller (24) computes
u(t) and transmit it to the actuator.
3) The plant input u(t) is recovered as (24b) at the actuator,
and fed back to the plant. At the same time, the signal
u(t) is re-encrypted11 and transmitted to the controller,
as the input u′(t) of (24).
4) Finally, with z(t), y(t), r(t), and u′(t), the controller
(24a) computes the next state z(t+ 1). 
Remark 5: For single output controllers, i.e., when m = 1,
it is able to have both the state matrix F ′ and the output
matrix H ′ of (21) as integers, at the same time. Indeed, the
pair (F ′, H ′) obtained from Lemma 1 can be assumed as
observable without loss of generality, and by Proposition 3,
there exists a matrix T ′ ∈ Rn′×n′ such that T ′F ′T ′−1 ∈ Zn′×n′
and H ′T ′−1 ∈ Z1×n′ , since F ′ ∈ Zn′×n′ . This may reduce the
size N for plaintext space, because in this case, the scaling of
H ′ in (23) is dispensable, i.e., H
′ ∈ Z1×n′ with 1/s2 = 1. In
practice, such representation can be obtained by considering
the transfer function of (21); let us define
H ′(zIn′ − F ′)−1[TG− RJ, TP − RQ, R] + [J,Q, 0n′×m]
=:
Bn′−1zn
′−1 + · · ·+B0
zn′ + an′−1zn
′−1 + · · ·+ a0 + [J,Q, 0n
′×m],
where Bi ∈ R1×(p+q+1) and ai ∈ Z, for i = 1, · · · , n′ − 1.
11 Note that, in (24a), the input u′(t) cannot be replaced with the outcome
u(t). This is because the message of u(t) has the value of u(t)/(Ls1s2)
whereas the input of (24a) must be of scale 1/L. It can be seen, in (24b) and
(14), that the function Su divides the factor 1/(s1s2), after the decryption.
9Then, obviously it can be realized as
z(t+ 1) =

0 · · · 0 −a0
1 · · · 0 −a1
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · 1 −an′−1
 z(t) +

B0
B1
...
Bn′−1
 ·
y(t)r(t)
u(t)

u(t) =
[
0 · · · 0 1] z(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t), (25)
where both the state and output matrix consist of integers. 
In Theorem 2, the value ‖γ(L, s1, s2, r)‖ can be understood
as an upper bound of perturbations due to quantization and
operation over encrypted data, with respect to the model (4).
It can be made arbitrarily small with the choice of parameters
since ‖γ(0, 0, 0, 0)‖ = 0, but as discussed in the previous
section, increasing the parameter 1/r of quantization may
cost more than the others, as it may be determined from
specification of the sensors and actuators. In other words, the
value of ‖∂γ∂r ‖ may be sensitive in practice, which in fact
depends on the choice of T and R for the conversion; from
(32), (33), (38), and (39), it can be computed as
C(T,R) :=
∥∥∥∥∂γ∂r (0, 0, 0, r)
∥∥∥∥ = max(1, ‖T′‖(1 + ‖R‖))2
·
∥∥∥∥[‖[TG− RJ,R]‖+ ‖TP − RQ‖‖J‖+ ‖Q‖+ 1
]∥∥∥∥ , (26)
where T′ ∈ Rn×n′ is such that T · T′ = In′ .
Given the parameters (L, s1, s2, r) with respect to the quan-
tized controller (13) such that ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η(), Corol-
lary 1 suggested that when encrypting (13) for the case
F ∈ Zn×n, the parameter r for quantization can be used as
the same to satisfy ‖β(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η(), to keep the same
level of performance. In fact, it was attributable to the fact the
value of ‖∂β/∂r‖ is the same with ‖∂α/∂r‖, as∥∥∥∥∂β∂r (0, 0, 0, r)
∥∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥∂α∂r (0, 0, 0, r)
∥∥∥∥
=
1
2
∥∥∥∥[ ‖G‖+ ‖P‖‖J‖+ ‖Q‖+ 1
]∥∥∥∥ = C(In, 0n×m), (27)
which corresponds to the case T = In and R = 0n×m for (21)
with (26), i.e., conversion of F is not considered thanks to the
condition F ∈ Zn×n.
For the general case12, the following corollary states that,
given the parameter r with respect to (13), the proposed
controller (24) with the parameters {r′y,i}pi=1, {r′r,i}qi=1, and
{r′u,i}mi=1 of quantization step sizes for (6) and (22) can have
the same level of performance, when they satisfy
r′ ≤ C(In, 0n×m)
C(T,R)
r, (28)
where r′ = max({r′y,i}pi=1 ∪ {r′r,i}qi=1 ∪ {r′u,i}mi=1).
12For the general case, the design of the quantized controller (13) would
consider the error due to truncation of F as well, which can be computed as∥∥∥∥Fx− Ls1 ⌈(s1 ⌈ Fs1
⌋)
· x
Ls1
⌋∥∥∥∥ ≤ 12Ls1 + n(‖X‖+ )2 s1
as the same as in (32) and (33), with respect to the controller (4) where
x = Ls1x, but it can be neglected in terms of the choice of r, as it can be
made arbitrarily small, by the choice of L and s1.
Corollary 3: Given (L, s1, s2, r) such that ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤
η(), and r′ > 0 satisfying (28), there exist L′ > 0, s′1 > 0,
and s′2 > 0 such that ‖γ(L′, s′1, s′2, r′)‖ ≤ η(). 
Proof: If ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≥ ‖γ(L, s1, s2, r′)‖, there is noth-
ing to prove. Suppose ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ < ‖γ(L, s1, s2, r′)‖,
and define f(k) := ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ − ‖γ(kL, ks1, ks2, r′)‖,
so that f(1) < 0. From (26), (27), and (28), we have
‖α(0, 0, 0, r)‖ ≥ ‖γ(0, 0, 0, r′)‖, and hence it follows that
f(0) > 0. By continuity, there exists 0 < k < 1 such that
‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ = ‖γ(kL, ks1, ks2, r′)‖. 
The encryption with the use of additively homomorphic
encryption is also straightforward, after the conversion to have
integer state matrix. Using the properties H1–H3 only, just as
the same as in (18), the controller (21) can be encrypted as
z(t+ 1) = F ′ · z(t) +G′ · y(t) + P ′ · r(t) + R · u′(t)
u(t) = H
′ · z(t) + J · y(t) +Q · r(t) (29)
z(0) = Enc(z(0) mod N),
where the information of matrices is stored in the controller
as plaintexts. As the following corollary, the encryption (29)
is also able to operate for infinite time horizon, with the same
level of performance.
Corollary 4: Supposing that ‖γ(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η() holds,
the encryption (29) with (24b) guarantees ‖u(t)− u′(t)‖ ≤ ,
for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. 
Proof: From (1) and (2), it is obvious that (24a) and (29)
have the same form of the dynamics for the messages, as
z(t+ 1) = F ′z(t) +G
′
y(t) + P
′
r(t) + Ru′(t)
+ ∆z(t) mod N
u(t) = H
′
z(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t) + ∆u(t) mod N
z(0) = z(0) + ∆0 mod N
with some ∆z(t) ∈ Zn′ , ∆u(t) ∈ Zm, t = 0, 1 · · · , and ∆0 ∈
Zn′ , where z(t) = Dec(z(t)) and u(t) = Dec(u(t)). It is clear
that the upper bound for the size of ‖∆z(t)‖, ‖∆u(t)‖, and
‖∆0‖ with respect to (2) is not larger than that of (1). 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section provides simulation results of the proposed
scheme applied to tracking control of three inertia system [17];
let the plant (3) be given as
x˙p(t) =

0 1 0 0 0 0
−k
J
−b
J
k
J 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
k
J 0
−2k
J
−b
J
k
J 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 kJ 0
−k
J
−b
J
xp(t) +

0
1
J
0
0
0
0
up(t)
=: Apxp(t) +Bpup(t)
yp(t) =
[
0 0 0 0 1 0
]
xp(t) =: Cpxp(t)
where J = 0.01 kg ·m2, b = 0.007 N ·m/(rad/s), and k =
1.37 N·m/rad, and the system (4) be designed as an observer-
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Fig. 1. Performance error ‖y(t) − y′(t)‖ of the quantized controller with
(L, s1, s2, r) = (2−12, 2−12, 2−12, 2−12) (black line), and of the encrypted
controller with (L, s1, s2, r) = (2−26, 2−19, 1, 2−15) (red dotted-line).
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Fig. 2. Performance error ‖y(t) − y′(t)‖ of the converted controller
(unencrypted) with (L, s1, r) = (2−15, 2−19, 2−15) (black line), and of the
encrypted controllers with (L, s1, r) = (2−18, 2−19, 2−15) (blue dashed-
line) and with (L, s1, r) = (2−26, 2−19, 2−15) (red dotted-line), respectively.
based discrete-time feedback controller with Ts = 50 ms, as
xˆp(t+ 1) = (Ad +BdK − LCp)xˆp(t) +BdKIξ(t) + Ly(t)
ξ(t+ 1) = ξ(t)− Cpxˆp(t) + r(t), x(t) = [xˆp(t)>, ξ(t)]>
u(t) = Kxˆp(t) +KIξ(t) = Hx(t), (30)
where Ad = exp(ApTs) and Bd =
∫ Ts
0
exp(Apτ)dτ ·Bp, and
K = − [2.32, 0.25, − 2.47, 0.04, 1.70, 0.12] ,KI = 0.1
L =
[
0.47, 4.07, − 0.03, − 6.80, 1.39, 6.21]> ,
are the proportional and integral feedback gains, and the in-
jection gain for the observer, respectively, so that the estimate
xˆp(t) converges to the plant state xp(t · Ts), and the output
yp(t) of the plant follows the reference r(t) ≡ 1.
To convert the state matrix F ∈ R7×7 of (30), the matrix R
is designed such that
det(zI7 − (F − RH)) = z7 − 3z6 + 3z5 − 3z4 + z3 − 1,
so that (30) is converted to the form (25) as in Remark 5, with
a0
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6

=

−1
0
0
1
−3
3
−3

,

B0
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6

=

−2.5357 0.0108 −0.9931
16.0183 −0.0737 −0.0794
−43.0087 0.2305 0.4673
62.9373 −0.4243 −0.3812
−53.2140 0.4849 −0.3892
24.8186 −0.3254 −0.4425
−5.0182 0.1000 −0.1886

.
Finally, Fig. 1 and 2 shows the simulation results of the
proposed encrypted controller, which operates without reset of
the state. Compared with the quantized controller, Fig. 1 shows
that the performance of the proposed encrypted controller can
be preserved with the choice of parameters, as suggested in
Theorem 2. And, Fig. 2 supports the statement of Corollary 1;
increasing the parameter 1/L only, it suppresses the effect of
injected errors and obtains the same level of performance with
the unencrypted model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have suggested that linear dynamic con-
trollers can be encrypted to operate for infinite time horizon
with the same level of performance, when the transmission
of the encrypted plant input to the controller is admitted. The
proposed method simply converts the state matrix of the given
controller by pole-placement design, so that it fixes the scale
of the control variables and eliminates the necessity of the
reset of the state. To conceal the control parameters as well
as the signals, the use of LWE-based cryptosystem has been
considered, in which it has been seen that the effect of injecting
errors to the messages is controlled by closed-loop stability.
APPENDIX
A. Cryptosystem based on Learning With Errors
This subsection briefly introduces the LWE-based encryp-
tion scheme [13], [16]. The encryption, operation, and decryp-
tion algorithms are described as follows, where the size N of
the plaintext space is supposed to be chosen as power of 2.
• Setup(1λ). Choose the bound σ ∈ N for the errors13, the
modulus q = N · 2q0 with q0 ∈ N ∪ {0}, and ν0 ∈ N
and d ∈ N so that ν := 2ν0 and νd−1 < q ≤ νd. Define
the spaces C and C′ of ciphertexts as C = Zn+1q and
C′ = Z(n+1)×n′q , where Zq := {0, 1, · · · , q − 1}, n ∈ N
is chosen sufficiently large to achieve the λ-bit security14,
and n′ := d(n+ 1). Return params = (q, σ, n, ν, d, n′).
• KeyGen(params). Generate the secret key sk ∈ Zn as a
row vector such that ‖sk>‖ ≤ σ. Return sk.
• Enc(m ∈ ZN , sk). Generate a random vector a ∈ Znq
and an error e ∈ Z such that |e| ≤ σ. Compute15 b =
−sk · a+ qNm+ e mod q. Return col{b, a} ∈ Zn+1q .
• Dec(c ∈ Zn+1q , sk). Let c = col{b, a} where b ∈ Zq and
a ∈ Znq . Return d(b+ sk · a) · Nq c mod N ∈ ZN .
• Add(c1 ∈ Zn+1q , c2 ∈ Zn+1q ). Return c1 + c2 mod q.
• IntMult(k ∈ Z, c ∈ Zn+1q ). Return k · c mod q.
• Enc′(k ∈ ZN , sk). Generate a random matrix A ∈ Zn×n′q ,
and a row vector E ∈ Zn′ such that ‖E>‖ ≤ σ. Compute
B = −sk ·A+ E. Return k · [In+1, ν · In+1, · · · , νd−1 ·
In+1] + [B
>, A>]>mod q ∈ Z(n+1)×n′q .
• Mult(c′ ∈ Z(n+1)×n′q , c ∈ Zn+1q ). For i = 0, · · · , d − 1,
compute ci = b cνi c − b cνi+1 cν so that c =
∑d−1
i=0 ciν
i.
Return c′ · col{ci}d−1i=0 mod q ∈ Zn+1q .
Proposition 4: The scheme satisfies the properties H1–H4,
with ∆Enc = dσNq c and ∆Mult = dd(n+1)σ·Nνq c+ 1. 
Proof: H1) By construction, Dec(Enc(m)) = dm + eNq c
mod N with some ‖e‖ ≤ σ. H2, H3) It can be easily proved
from the fact that |dζ1c+ dζ2c − dζ1 + ζ2c| ≤ 1, ∀ζ1 ∈ R and
ζ2 ∈ R. H4) Following the construction of Enc′ and Mult,
observe that [1, sk] · [B>, A>]> = E and [In+1, · · · , νd−1 ·
In+1] · col{ci}d−1i=0 = c. Hence, for k ∈ ZN and c ∈ Zn+1q , it
13The Gaussian distribution is considered for injected errors in usual, but
we consider uniform distribution for all the random numbers, for simplicity.
14 The parameters (n, q, σ, λ) are known to satisfy n
log q−log σ ∝ λlog λ .
15In terms of the modulo operation by q for the ciphertexts, we abuse
notation and use m mod q := m− bm
q
cq ∈ Zq for m ∈ Z.
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follows [1, sk] ·Mult(Enc′(k), c) = E ·col{ci}d−1i=0 +k[1, sk] ·c,
and Dec(Mult(Enc′(k), c)) = dNq (E · col{ci}d−1i=0 + k[1, sk] ·
c)c = k · Dec(c) + dNq E · col{ci}d−1i=0 c + ∆ with |∆| ≤ 1,
where ‖E‖ ≤ d(n+ 1)σ and ‖col{ci}d−1i=0 ‖ ≤ ν. 
Remark 6: One of the benefit of the described scheme
is that each unit of the operations can be implemented with
simple modular matrix multiplication, in which the operations
such as ( ·mod q) or b·/νc can be performed by bit operations,
thanks to the parameters (q,N, ν) chosen as power of 2. 
More explanations and example codes can be found in [18].
B. Technical Lemmas and Proofs
The following proposition considers the closed-loop stabil-
ity when the sizes of perturbations ex(t) and eu(t) of the
controller (4) may depend on the sizes of x(t), y(t) and r(t).
Proposition 5: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, suppose that
there exist non-negative constants {ηix, ηiu}4i=1 such that
‖ex(t)‖ ≤ η1x‖x(t)‖+ η2x‖y(t)‖+ η3x‖r(t)‖+ η4x
‖eu(t)‖ ≤ η1u‖x(t)‖+ η2u‖y(t)‖+ η3u‖r(t)‖+ η4u (31)
η() ≥ η1x(‖X‖+ ) + η2x(‖Y‖+ ) + η3x‖R‖+ η4x
η() ≥ η1u(‖X‖+ ) + η2u(‖Y‖+ ) + η3u‖R‖+ η4u.
If ‖e0‖ ≤ η(), then (5) holds for t ≥ 0 and t ∈ N ∪ {0}. 
Proof: As ‖e0‖ ≤ η(), Assumption 1 implies that ‖y(0)‖ ≤
‖Y‖ +  and ‖x(0)‖ ≤ ‖X‖ + , by causality, and hence
‖ex(0)‖ ≤ η() and ‖eu(0)‖ ≤ η() by (31). Suppose
‖ex(t)‖ ≤ η() and ‖eu(t)‖ ≤ η() for t = 0, 1, ..., τ . By
Assumption 1 and causality, (5) holds for 0 ≤ t < (τ + 1) ·Ts
and 0 ≤ t ≤ τ . Then, it follows that ‖y(τ + 1)‖ ≤ ‖Y‖+  by
continuity, and ‖x(τ + 1)‖ ≤ ‖X‖+ . Thus, ‖ex(τ + 1)‖ ≤
η() and ‖eu(τ + 1)‖ ≤ η(), and hence, by induction,
‖ex(t)‖ ≤ η() and ‖eu(t)‖ ≤ η() for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
It concludes that (5) holds for all t ∈ N ∪ {0} and t ≥ 0. 
The following Lemma states that the performance of the
controller (36) over Z and that of (34) over ZN with modulo
operation can be equivalent in the closed-loop, if N is suffi-
ciently large to cover the range of the output of the controller.
Lemma 2: Consider the closed-loop systems (3) and (34)
with u(t) = Su(mod(u(t), N, {umin,i }mi=1)), and (3) and (36)
with u(t) = Su(u(t)). Suppose u(t) = col{ui(t)}mi=1 satisfies
umin,i ≤ ui(t) ≤ umin,i +N−1, for all i = 1, · · · ,m and t ∈ N∪
{0}. Then, u(t) = mod(u(t), N, {umin,i }mi=1) and x(t) = x(t)
mod N for all t ∈ N∪{0}, and the closed-loops have the state
xp(t) and the output yp(t) of (3) as the same for all t ≥ 0. 
Proof: Observe that x(0) = x(0) mod N . Then, we sup-
pose x(t) = x(t) mod N at time t, and the state xp(t) of
(3) with respect to (34) and that with respect to (36) are the
same at t = t · Ts. First, as (34) and (36) share the same
input y(t) at time t, it is obvious that x(t + 1) = x(t + 1)
mod N and u(t) = u(t) mod N . It follows that u(t) =
mod(u(t), N, {umin,i }mi=1), so the plant with (34) and the plant
with (36) have the input up(t) as well as the state xp(t) as the
same, for t ·Ts ≤ t < (t+1) ·Ts. And, by continuity, they also
have the state xp(t) as the same, at t = (t+1) ·Ts. Therefore,
by induction, it is concluded that x(t) = x(t) mod N and
u(t) = mod(u(t), N, {umin,i }mi=1) for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}, and the
plant with (34) and the plant with (36) have the signals up(t),
xp(t), and yp(t) as the same, for all t ≥ 0. 
1) Proof of Proposition 1: With x(t) = Ls1x(t), and
u(t) = Su(u(t)), we consider the closed-loop of (3) and (4),
where ex(t) = Ls1δx(t), eu(t) = Ls1s2δu(t) + (Su(u(t)) −
Ls1s2u(t)), and e0 = Ls1δ0. First, it can be derived that16
‖δx(t)‖ ≤ p‖y(t)‖
2L
+
q‖r(t)‖
2L
+
δp
Lr
+
‖G‖+ ‖P‖
2Lrs1
=: αx(‖y(t)‖, ‖r(t)‖, L, s1, r),
‖δu(t)‖ ≤ n‖x(t)‖
2Ls1
+
p‖y(t)‖
2L
+
q‖r(t)‖
2L
+
δp
Lr
+
‖J‖+ ‖Q‖
2Lrs1s2
=: αu(‖x(t)‖, ‖y(t)‖, ‖r(t)‖, L, s1, s2, r), (32)
where δp := (p+q)/4 and 1/Lr := 1+ r/L, so that ‖ex(t)‖ ≤
Ls1 · αx and ‖eu(t)‖ ≤ Ls1s2 · αu + r/2. Then, we define
α(L, s1, s2, r) (33)
:=
 Ls1 · αx(‖Y‖+ , ‖R‖, L, s1, r)Ls1s2 · αu(‖X‖+ , ‖Y‖+ , ‖R‖, L, s1, s2, r) + 12 r
1
2Ls1
 ,
where ‖V‖ := maxv∈V ‖v‖ for compact set V given from
Assumption 2. It is clear that α(0, 0, 0, 0) = [0, 0, 0]>. Now,
with ‖α(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η(), Proposition 5 completes the
proof, with the functions Ls1 · αx and Ls1s2 · αu + r/2. 
2) Proof of Theorem 1: Let x(t) := Dec(x(t)) ∈ ZnN and
u(t) := Dec(u(t)) ∈ ZmN . From (1) and H1, it follows that
x(t+ 1) = F x(t) +Gy(t) + Pr(t) + ∆x(t) mod N
u(t) = Hx(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t) + ∆u(t) mod N
x(0) = x(0) + ∆0 mod N
(34)
with some ∆x(t) ∈ Zn, ∆u(t) ∈ Zm, and ∆0 ∈ Zn such that
‖∆x(t)‖ ≤ ‖F‖+ ‖G‖(1 + ∆Enc) + ‖P‖(1 + ∆Enc)
+ (n + p + q)(∆Mult + 1)− 1
≤ ‖F‖+ (‖G‖+ ‖P‖)(1 + ∆Enc)
s1
+
p + q
2
+ (n + p + q)(∆Mult + 1)− 1 =: βx(s1) (35)
‖∆u(t)‖ ≤ ‖H‖
s2
+
(‖J‖+ ‖Q‖)(1 + ∆Enc)
s1s2
+
n + p + q
2
+ (n + p + q)(∆Mult + 1)− 1 =: βu(s1, s2)
and ‖∆0‖ ≤ ∆Enc. With these terms, we rewrite (4) as
x(t+ 1) = F x(t) +Gy(t) + Pr(t) + ∆x(t)
u(t) = Hx(t) + Jy(t) +Qr(t) + ∆u(t)
x(0) = x(0) + ∆0,
(36)
with the relations x(t) = Ls1x(t) and u(t) = Su(u(t)), where
ex(t) = Ls1(δx(t) + ∆x(t))
eu(t) = Ls1s2(δu(t) + ∆u(t)) + (S
u(u(t))− Ls1s2u(t))
e0 = Ls1(δ0 + ∆0).
16 For example, note that y(t) = y(t)/L+δy with ‖δy‖ ≤ (1+r/L)/2 =
1/(2Lr), as in (8), and dG/s1c = G/s1 + δG with ‖δG‖ ≤ p/2 imply
‖dG/s1cy(t) − Gy(t)/(Ls1)‖ = ‖δGy(t)/L + δyG/s1 + δGδy‖ ≤
p‖y(t)‖/(2L) + ‖G‖/(2Lrs1) + p/(4Lr).
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With the function α defined in Proposition 1, we define
β(L, s1, s2, r) := α(L, s1, s2, r) +
 Ls1 · βx(s1)Ls1s2 · βu(s1, s2)
Ls1∆Enc.
 , (37)
so that it satisfies β(0, 0, 0, 0) = [0, 0, 0]>. Then, by Proposi-
tion 5 with the functions Ls1(αx +βx) and Ls1s2(αu +βu) +
r/2, ‖β(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η() implies that the closed-loop of (3)
and (36) satisfies (5) for all t ≥ 0 and t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
From ‖Su(u(t))−u′(t)‖ <  and u′(t) ∈ U , the design (14)–
(16) guarantees that umin,i ≤ ui(t) ≤ umin,i +N−1 holds, where
u(t) = col{ui(t)}mi=1, for all i = 1, · · · ,m and t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Therefore, Lemma 2 in Appendix B completes the proof. 
3) Proof of Proposition 2: Let λ1, · · · , λn−2m, σ1 ±
jω1, · · · , σm ± jωm be the eigenvalues of F , where j ∈ C is
such that j2 = −1, λi ∈ Z for every i = 1, · · · , n− 2m, and
σi ∈ Z and ωi ∈ Z for every i = 1, · · · ,m. It is clear that
the transformation of F to the modal canonical form yields a
matrix consisting of integers; there exists T ∈ Rn×n such that
the matrix TFT−1 ∈ Rn×n takes the form of
λ1 γ1 · · · 0
0 λ2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . γn−2m−1
0 · · · 0 λn−2m
0(n−2m)×2m
02m×(n−2m)
Λ1 Γ1 · · · 02×2
02×2 Λ2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . Γm−1
02×2 · · · 02×2 Λm

,
where γi = 0 or 1 for each i = 1, · · · , n− 2m− 1,
Λi =
[
σi ωi
−ωi σi
]
∈ Z2×2 for each i = 1, · · · ,m,
and Γi = 02×2 or I2, for each i = 1, · · · ,m− 1. 
4) Proof of Theorem 2: We show that the closed-loop of (3)
and (21) is stable with respect to the perturbations e′0, ez(t),
and eu(t). Given  > 0, define θ() := η()/max(1, ‖T′‖(1+
‖R‖)), where T′ ∈ Rn×n′ is such that T · T′ = In′ . And,
let ‖e′0‖ ≤ θ(), ‖ez(t)‖ ≤ θ(), and ‖eu(t)‖ ≤ θ(), for
all t ∈ N ∪ {0}. Consider (4) as an auxiliary system, with
e0 = T
′e′0 and ex(t) = T
′(ez(t) + Reu(t)). As e′0 = Te0 and
ez(t) = Tex(t)− Reu(t), it follows, from (20) and (21), that
it satisfies z(t) = Tx(t) for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}, and (4) and (21)
have the output u(t) as the same, as well. As θ() is defined
to guarantee ‖e0‖ ≤ η(), ‖ex(t)‖ ≤ η(), and ‖eu(t)‖ ≤
η() for all t, Assumption 1 implies that the controller (21)
guarantees that (5a) hold for all t ≥ 0, and ‖u(t)−u′(t)‖ ≤ 
and ‖z(t)− Tx′(t)‖ ≤ ‖T‖, for all t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
And, as e′0 = 0, ez(t) = 0, and eu(t) = 0 implies ex(t) =
0 and e0 = 0, the conditions of Assumption 2 with respect
to the closed-loop of (3) and (21) hold as the same, where
the bound for the state z′(t) = Tx′(t) can be obtained as
maxv∈X ‖Tv‖ ≤ ‖T‖ ·maxv∈X ‖v‖ = ‖T‖·‖X‖.
Then, since F ′ ∈ Zn′×n′ in (21), the proof is completed
by applying Theorem 1 to the closed-loop of (3) and (21), in
which the signal [y(t)>, u(t)>]> ∈ Rp+m is regarded as the
input of the controller. The function γ is obtained analogously
to (32), (33), (35), and (37); define a function P that maps
the parameters of (4) to the function β, as
P : (‖F‖, ‖G‖, ‖H‖, ‖J‖, ‖P‖, ‖Q‖, n, p, q, ‖X‖, ‖Y‖, ‖R‖)
7→ β(L, s1, s2, r). (38)
Then, we define the same function γθ with respect to (21), as
γθ(L, s1, s2, r)
:= P(‖F ′‖, ‖[TG− RJ, R]‖, ‖H ′‖, ‖J‖, ‖TP − RQ‖, ‖Q‖,
n′, p + m, q, ‖T‖·‖X‖, max(‖Y‖, ‖U‖), ‖R‖), (39)
and further define γ(L, s1, s2, r) :=
η()
θ() · γθ(L, s1, s2, r). It is
clear that γ(0, 0, 0, 0) = [0, 0, 0]>. Then, as the condition
‖γ(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ η() implies ‖γθ(L, s1, s2, r)‖ ≤ θ(), it
guarantees that ‖u(t)− u′(t)‖ ≤  holds for all t ∈ N ∪ {0},
according to Theorem 1 applied to the controller (21). 
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